Lesetid
7 min lesetid
Publisert
07. okt. 2021
Artikkelen er flere år gammel
DNB Markets morgenrapport 7. oktober 2021
Timing betyr noe
Forskjøvet innbetaling av petroleumsskatt kan gi store kronekjøp og sterkere krone fremover.
Hvert år planlegges det for et underskudd på statsbudsjettet. Det innebærer et behov for kroner som dels dekkes gjennom petroleumsnæringens skatteinnbetalinger, og om nødvendig, dels gjennom Norges Banks daglige kronekjøp. Størrelsen på det oljekorrigerte budsjettunderskuddet er dermed førende for hvor mye kroner som veksles i forbindelse med innfasingen av petroleumsinntekter i økonomien. Over tid. For store prisendringer på olje og gass kan lage midlertidige knuter på tråden. Som nå.
Staten må nemlig gjøre opp underskuddet innenfor hvert kalenderår. Det er bare det at petroleumsselskapene betaler deler av sin skatt for 2021 i år, og deler i 2022. Og den delen de betaler i år er basert på anslag for året gitt i mai/juni. Samtidig vil mange oljeselskap veksle om sine antatte skattebetalinger løpende for å redusere valutakursrisikoen og unngå store og forutsigbare vekslinger rett før skatteforfall. Vi kan derfor ende med en situasjon nå i fjerde kvartal hvor galopperende råvarepriser gjør at petroleumsselskapene kjøper stadig mer kroner, mens Norges Bank fortsetter sine kronekjøp fordi skatteinnbetalingene til staten ikke kommer før i 2022. Motstykket vil bli at behovet for kronekjøp i 2022 vil ble tilsvarende mindre. Men for kronekursutviklingen her og nå vil det bety noe. Og skattevekslingene har nok vært en viktig årsak til at det er lite spor av aksjemarkedskorreksjon i kronekursutviklingen de siste ukene.
Så skal det legges til at det finnes en ventil. Petroleumsselskapene kan fritt velge å betale mer enn utskrevet terminskatt ved forfallet 1. oktober. I så fall øker statens inntekter i 2021, og Norges Bank vil kunne redusere sine daglige kronekjøp tilsvarende allerede nå. Meg bekjent er det først med publiseringen av Norges Banks likviditetsstatistikk i morgen vi får svaret. Mer detaljer finner du i et notat jeg skrev i går (se faktaboks under for hele notatet).
Gassprisene i Europa og UK satte nye rekordnoteringer i går. Det øker bare presset på politikerne. Ikke bare er mange bekymret for at det setter oppsvinget etter pandemien i fare, men også for at ambisjonene omkring det grønne skiftet skal bli skadelidende. Flere EU-land brukte gårsdagens møte i Slovenia for å kanalisere sin misnøye mot EU-kommisjonen og dens manglende tiltak så langt. Samtidig kom Russland på banen i går da president Putin sa at russerne var villige til å bidra til å stabilisere prisene ved å øke leveransene av gass til Europa. Etter at prisen på britisk gass først hadde steget 28 prosent fra stengetid på fredag, snudde prisen tvert om og endte dagen ned 17 prosent. Likevel, den er fortsatt 4 ganger høyere enn ved inngangen til 2021.
Svensk BNP skuffer. Fallet på 3,8 prosent i BNP-indikatoren fra juli til august var klart svakere enn ventet, og var trolig bredt basert. Fra annen statistikk vet vi at det private konsumet trakk ned, ordreinngangen i industrien trakk ned, produksjonen trakk ned og dessuten utviklet eksporten seg svakt. Likevel, vi mener utviklingen i svensk økonomi ikke er like svak som tallet gir inntrykk av. For det første er det store svingninger fra måned til måned i denne midlertidige statistikken, og forrige måned ble dessuten opprevidert. Samtidig er utviklingen noe svakere enn den Riksbanken la til grunn for tredje kvartal, og aktiviteten i Sverige vil trolig også begrenses noe av flaskehalser i verdikjedene fremover.
Stadig høyere energipriser bidro til at det lenge var en svak børsdag i går. Europeiske aksjemarkeder endte dagen ned 1-1,5 prosent, mens oljeprisen på et tidspunkt handlet opp mot 83,5 dollar/fatet. I USA bidro imidlertid sterke sysselsettingstall fra ADP og utsikter til enighet om en midlertidig heving av gjeldstaket til å snu stemningen. Dessuten bidro Putins kommentarer til fall i energipriser mer generelt, og oljeprisen endte dagen ned under 81 dollar/fatet. Det bidro til at amerikanske aksjemarkeder endte så vidt i pluss og oppgang i asiatiske markeder så langt i dag.
It’s a timing issue – Petroleum taxes, budget deficit and the NOK
The short-term outlook for the NOK is in some sense binary. It partly depends on the timing of petroleum tax payments, which we will know for sure tomorrow. If petroleum companies voluntarily paid more taxes due on 1 October based on the recent surge in commodity prices, it should enable Norges Bank to adjust its daily NOK purchases in Q4 accordingly. If petroleum companies did not, we could end up with both Norges Bank and petroleum companies buying large amounts of NOK in Q4. When we get to 2022, however, several factors should mean NOK purchases will be considerably lower.
Timing matters, although total NOK purchases equal fiscal deficits in the end. The Norwegian fiscal budget is made up by a deficit each year, and the fiscal rule acts as a guideline for the size of the deficit. This deficit is funded partly by taxes on petroleum companies, which exchange their FX revenues for NOK to pay their taxes, and partly by Norges Bank, which fills the gap via its daily NOK purchases.
The fiscal budget deficit needs to be funded in its entirety within the calendar year. Petroleum taxes, however, are paid in six instalments, whereof only the first three are within the year of earnings. The devil is in the detail of petroleum taxes. Petroleum taxes accrued in H2 are based on companies’ estimates of earnings for the full year made in May/June. The final three instalments due in the following year can be adjusted in December/January if earnings are likely to differ from the estimates made in May/June. What is more, petroleum companies can voluntarily prepay taxes at the second instalment due on 1 October and are incentivised to do so by having to pay interest if prepaid taxes are lower than assessed taxes.
This obviously matters now. The recent surge in commodity prices will raise assessed taxes for 2021 compared with the estimates made in May/June. However, the increased tax burden will only fund the 2021 budget deficit if voluntary prepayments have been made on 1 October. If so, Norges Bank can adjust its daily NOK purchases in Q4 accordingly. If not, Norges Bank will have to continue to bridge the gap between the budget deficit and petroleum taxes based on the price estimates from May/June.
To hedge their FX exposure and prevent large-scale and foreseeable transactions ahead of tax dates, oil companies tend to exchange revenues for tax purposes regularly. The temporary change in the petroleum tax regime last year means petroleum taxes this year are estimated in the Revised National Budget to be only NOK54bn, corresponding to NOK purchases of ~NOK200m per day if revenues are evenly distributed throughout the year. However, the value of Norwegian exports of oil and gas reached a record high in August, and since then oil prices have risen by ~10% and gas prices by ~200%. Assuming oil and gas each represent 50% of export volumes, we estimate a volume-weighted price increase of more than 100%. According to the Ministry of Finance’s (MoF) own calculations, a NOK10 increase in oil prices would raise the government’s net petroleum revenues by NOK4.7bn and tax receipts by NOK2.9bn. Assuming oil and gas prices remain at the current levels for the rest of 2021, we calculate a NOK55bn increase in tax receipts. However, given that MoF’s calculations assume that the rise in gas prices lags behind the rise in oil prices, we would expect tax receipts to be even larger.
While prices are higher, there are some indications of increasing volumes. According to data from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, oil and gas production up to July this year was on track to reach the 229m Sm3 o.e. expected in the Revised National Budget. Equinor has recently received permission to increase gas exports, but for 2021 this represents only 0.5% of total gas production.
Anyhow, the fiscal budget deficit will be lower next year, reducing the need for NOK purchases The fiscal stimulus during the pandemic was strong, leading to an oil-corrected fiscal budget deficit corresponding to 3.7% and 3.3% of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) in 2020 and 2021, respectively, outpacing the 3% fiscal rule. The temporary changes to the petroleum tax regime introduced as part of the pandemic response mean tax revenues from the petroleum sector are lower than normal. To still be able to cover the budget deficit in NOK, Norges Bank’s daily NOK purchases have been high, likely amounting to cNOK380bn in 2020 and 2021. The outgoing government will present next year’s budget on 12 October, and we expect to see a smaller fiscal impulse next year. This would lower the need for NOK purchases somewhat.
Reduction in Treasury’s deposits at Norges Bank would lessen the need for NOK purchases next year What is more, the announced reduction in the Treasury’s deposits at Norges Bank should reduce the need for NOK purchases. Current legislation implies that parliament has agreed to a fiscal budget deficit and the corresponding transfer from GPFG, with no way of making up for any difference between the budget and the outcome. Last year, the government ended up with a lower budget deficit than expected. The result was a significant increase in the Treasury’s deposits at Norges Bank (see chart below) with a corresponding tightening of the structural liquidity in the banking sector and NOK purchases being too large. The MoF has announced it will NOK Comment 06.10.2021 present new legislation to try to balance this out, and we expect this to be made public alongside the National Budget on 12 October.
We see two alternatives. First, unused funds from last year could be transferred back to GPFG. If so, this would require NOK selling, as GPFG is prohibited from keeping NOK on its books. We consider this option unlikely, because it would lead to an unnecessary increase in transaction costs, as Norges Bank is likely to sell FX to fund the current year’s budget deficit at the same time. A more plausible alternative would be for the government to allow unused funds in one year to finance parts of the following year’s budget deficit. In this case, we could expect to see the cNOK100bn rise in the Treasury’s deposits last year be gradually cut over the course of 2022, thereby reducing the need for NOK purchases and lifting structural liquidity by the same amount.